ABSTRACT: On January 22, 2002, Kmart Corporation filed voluntary petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy laws. While under Chapter 11 protection, Kmart renegotiated its debt, shed some of its non-performing assets, and issued new equity. Financier Eddie Lampert of ESL Investments bought much of Kmart's debt for less than $1 billion while it was in bankruptcy. As part of the reorganization plan, virtually all of Kmart's debt was converted into shares, and ESL Investments emerged as Kmart's largest shareholder. Subsequent to its emergence from bankruptcy on May 6, 2003, Kmart's stock has gone up from around $15/share to nearly $80/share over a period of one year. The case requires students to analyze Kmart's financial performance prior to the bankruptcy, identify the circumstances leading to the bankruptcy, use projected financial statements to derive Kmart's value post-bankruptcy, and explore issues related to Kmart's adoption of Fresh Start reporting upon its emergence from bankruptcy. The case questions fall into five categories: (1) pre-bankruptcy evaluation, (2) reorganization plan and Kmart in bankruptcy, (3) Fresh Start reporting, (4) bankruptcy valuation analysis, and (5) post-bankruptcy performance. The questions are largely independent, allowing instructors the flexibility to adopt only the sections relevant to their courses.
Under Chapter 11, a firm is allowed to continue its operations under the supervision of the bankruptcy court while a plan of reorganization is prepared and negotiated with its creditors. The firm has an exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization for a period of 120 days after the initial filing of bankruptcy. Another advantage of filing for Chapter 11 is that an automatic stay is imposed: all payments of interest and principal on debt ceases, and creditors are prevented from taking any action against the firm to collect claims or seize assets. The reorganization plan assigns claimholders into classes according to the characteristics of their claims (broadly based on seniority) and proposes a distribution to these claimholders. After the reorganization plan is submitted to the Court, the firm and the creditors enter into negotiations on the specific terms of the plan.
The Bankruptcy Code requires the bankruptcy court to determine that the plan is in the ''best interests'' of all holders of claims that are impaired by the Plan and that have not accepted the plan. The ''best interests'' test, as set forth in Section 1129(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code, requires the bankruptcy court to find either that (1) all members of an impaired class of claims have accepted the plan, or (2) the plan will provide a member that has not accepted the plan with a recovery that is no less than the amount that such holder would recover if the firm were liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (called ''liquidation analysis'').
Further, under Section 1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code, the firm must demonstrate to the bankruptcy court (typically by submitting projected financial statements and value estimates of the reorganized entity) the feasibility of the plan to ensure that the confirmation of the plan will not be followed by liquidation or a need for further financial reorganization.
Clearly, the estimated value of a reorganized firm is critical for the different classes of claimants, especially the classes that are impaired in the reorganization. Since the value of the reorganized firm affects the recoveries of the different classes of claimants, it is a contentious issue. All interested parties understand that the value of the firm is estimated based on unaudited projections of operations, cash flow, and related balance sheets. These projections reflect numerous assumptions and estimates about the future performance of the firm and the industry, as well as general business and economic conditions. Furthermore, one needs to choose from a range of possible valuation models and make subjective judgments about the weights to be attached to the various competing models. In Chapter 11 reorganizations, a claimant's return depends on two key values: the ''true'' value of the firm's net assets and the estimated value used in the reorganization plan to decide on payouts to various claimholders (called ''Plan Value'').
The bankruptcy court will confirm the reorganization if the following three requirements are met:
(1) A two-thirds majority of each class of impaired claimants accepts the plan (unimpaired classes are not allowed to vote on the plan). (2) Each dissenting claimant receives at least the amount it would have received in a liquidation (called the Best Interests test). (3) The plan is feasible; that is, the confirmation of the plan is not followed by a liquidation or another request for further restructuring.
Once the bankruptcy court confirms the plan and sets the date for emergence from Chapter 11, it is binding on all claimants, even those that did not accept the plan or were impaired under the plan.
KMART'S REORGANIZATION
Appendix F provides a summary of the treatment of selected classes of Kmart's claimholders under the Joint Plan of Reorganization that was confirmed by the Court on April 23, 2003. As noted earlier, the estimated value of a reorganized Kmart affects the recoveries of the different classes of claimants, especially the classes that are impaired in the Reorganization Plan.
Kmart In a comparable public company analysis, a subject company is valued by comparing it to publicly held companies in reasonably similar lines of business. The comparable public companies are chosen based on, among other attributes, their similarity to the subject company's business, presence in the market, and size. The price that an investor is willing to pay in the public markets for each company's publicly traded securities represents that company's current and future prospects as well as the rate of return required on the investment. Numerous financial multiples and ratios were developed to measure each company's valuation and relative performance. Some of the specific analyses entailed comparing the enterprise value (defined as market value of equity plus debt minus excess cash) for each of the comparable public companies to their sales, EBITDA, and EBIT, as well as comparing their equity values to net income and book value. Where appropriate, the Financial Advisors applied these multiples to the projected financials of the Reorganized Debtors to determine an implied range of enterprise and equity values for the Reorganized Debtors.
(b) Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
The discounted cash flow method relates the value of an asset or business to the present value of expected future cash flows to be generated by that asset or business. Reorganized Kmart's' projected cash flows after debt service (as set forth in the Business Plan [see Appendix E]) were discounted to a present value as of the Effective Date using a discount rate equal to the weighted average cost of capital for Reorganized Kmart. For purposes of the valuation analysis, the Financial Advisors used a range of discount rates between 20 percent and 25 percent, which reflects a number of company-and market-specific factors, including business execution risk and the nature and derivation of the projections set forth in the Business Plan as well as the cost of equity for companies that the Financial Advisors deemed comparable.
Using the above methodologies, Miller, Buckfire, Lewis & Co. estimated the value of Kmart on April 30, 2003, to range from approximately $2,250 million to $3,000 million, The value does not include excess cash, if any, remaining after cash distributions under the plan. The excess cash, if any, is assumed to be necessary to run the business and not viewed as free cash flow for valuation purposes.
The equity value of reorganized Kmart was estimated to range from approximately $753 million to $1,503 million or from approximately $8.74/share to $17.43/share assuming a total of 86,236,453 common shares issued and outstanding as of April 30, 2003. Under existing accounting rules, Kmart is required to adopt Fresh Start Reporting upon its emergence from bankruptcy. Fresh Start Reporting requires firms in Chapter 11 bankruptcy to estimate and report assets and liabilities at their reorganization value, which approximates fair value at the date of emergence from Chapter 11. The Fresh Start Accounting adjustments (see Appendix B) for Kmart are based in part on the enterprise valuation analysis prepared by Miller, Buckfire, Lewis & Co. Application of Fresh Start Accounting adjustments to reflect the fair value of assets and liabilities and the write-off of the Predecessor Company's equity resulted in a charge of $5.6 billion. The restructuring of Kmart's capital structure and resulting discharge of prepetition debt resulted in a gain of $5.1 billion. The charge for the revaluation of the assets and liabilities and the gain on the discharge of prepetition debt are recorded in Reorganization Items, not in the Consolidated Statement of Operations.
As noted in Lehavy (2002) , these Fresh Start Accounting adjustments are important for two reasons. One, management's reported estimate of the Fresh Start value of assets and liabilities plays a vital role during bankruptcy negotiations because it determines the allocation among various bankruptcy claimants. Second, the management of the firm under bankruptcy has significant discretion in the determination of the estimates, and their choices reveal their biases and objectives.
Since in Chapter 11 reorganization debt held by claimants is frequently exchanged for equity, claimants who hold sufficient percentages of various classes of outstanding debt can have a strong bargaining position to influence the terms of reorganization, including the determination of the Fresh Start values. This motivates investors, often referred to as vulture investors in the popular press, to strategically buy debt of a firm in Chapter 11 reorganization in order to obtain majority ownership in the reorganized firm.
VULTURE INVESTING
Vulture investing is essentially investing in distressed securities, which are securities of companies that are in financial trouble and in the process of restructuring, reorganization, or liquidation under local bankruptcy laws. The basic strategy is to buy securities, usually debt, at a significant discount to its intrinsic value and then exit in one of two ways. Investors can simply trade out of their positions and sell their securities when the prices are higher. This is possible because with the increase in the number of large public companies in financial distress, an active market for trading claims of distressed companies has developed (Hotchkiss and Mooradian 1997) . Alternatively, investors can swap their debt claims for cash or equity during reorganization. Vulture investors strategically purchase a sufficient percentage of various classes of outstanding debt, so that they have a strong bargaining position to influence the terms of the reorganization. In Chapter 11 reorganizations, where debt held by vulture investors is exchanged for a majority of the equity of the company, vulture investors can significantly influence management and/or gain control. By pushing the firm to run more profitably, they can increase the value of their holdings as the firm emerges from bankruptcy. Gilson (2001) outlines the simple strategy vulture investors use to purchase securities of firms in bankruptcy. Purchasing equity is generally an ineffective way to acquire or exercise control of a financially distressed firm, since typically equity holders do not enjoy high recovery rates during bankruptcy. With regard to purchasing debt claims, typically senior claims in the capital structure receive new senior claims (new debt or cash) in exchange for their pre-bankruptcy debt, whereas more junior claims receive common stock. Thus, with a view to gaining control of the distressed firm as it emerges from bankruptcy, investors prefer to purchase junior claims to senior secured claims. However, the most junior claims may have very low recovery rates because the firm's assets may not be worth enough to pay all the claims.
Bankruptcy rules influence the amount of different claims an investor will need to hold during reorganization. Before the bankruptcy court will approve a reorganization plan, each claimant class votes for or against the plan. The required percentage of votes required varies with the types of claims within the class. Typically, a class is deemed to have accepted the plan if at least a majority (in number) of claimholders in that class and at least two-thirds (in value) vote for the plan. Thus, an investor needs to hold slightly more than one-third of the claims in a particular class to threaten to hold up the firm's reorganization plan unless that claim class is given a higher recovery rate. However, an investor's ability to secure a higher recovery rate is limited by the ''cram down provision'' of the bankruptcy code. The ''cram down provision'' allows the Court to confirm the reorganization plan over the objections of the claimholders of a particular class, if it finds that the plan is fair and equitable to each impaired class, and does not unfairly discriminate with respect to each claim that has not accepted the plan. Under the Reorganization Plan, the prepetition lenders would be entitled to cash and shares in reorganized Kmart in satisfaction of the Prepetition Lender Claims (Class 3 Claims). However, under the settlement agreed to by the parties, the Prepetition Lenders (other than ESL Investments and Third Avenue Trust) received only cash instead of cash and shares in an amount equal to 45 percent of the amount of their claims. ESL Investments and Third Avenue Trust received only shares in the reorganized Kmart instead of cash and shares in satisfaction of their Prepetition Lender Claims. In addition, they received shares for the other claims they held in Kmart as per the Reorganization Plan. Based on the above transactions and settlements, ESL Investments and Third Avenue collectively held slightly in excess of 50 percent of all shares of the newly reorganized Kmart.
During the bankruptcy proceedings, Eddie Lampert, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and principal owner of ESL Investments, was appointed Chairman and Director of Kmart. Crucially, Mr. Lampert sat on the Financial Institutions Committee (FIC), the committee overseeing the bankruptcy on behalf of the claimholders. Because of his position on the FIC, Mr. Lampert was able to significantly affect the bankruptcy proceedings in addition to being able to appoint six of the nine Kmart board members. Upon Kmart's emergence from bankruptcy on May 6, 2003, Mr. Lampert became Chairman of the company.
Kmart's performance since emerging from bankruptcy has been remarkable. For the fourth quarter ended January 2004, Kmart reported net income of $276 million compared to an $834 million loss a year earlier, although total sales for the 39 weeks fell 23 percent to $17.07 billion, with same-store sales sliding 9.5 percent. Commenting on the quarter's results, Julian Day, president and chief executive officer, said, ''By giving careful thought to the processes of sourcing, logistics, pricing, inventory management, and in-store presentation, we have significantly improved the profitability of our market basket. Our improved inventory management, along with cash flow from operations and receipts from sales of surplus real estate, has significantly strengthened our cash position.''
The primary reason for Kmart's stellar performance since emerging from bankruptcy has been its real estate transactions. Kmart owned and leased thousands of store locations with extremely favorable terms with very low fixed lease rates for periods that exceeded 50 years. Although these lease terms were very valuable, Kmart, using Fresh Start Reporting rules, reported its Property and Equipment as having a total value of just $10 million ( Roebuck justified their decision to merge by asserting that the combined $55 billion retail giant would produce stronger brands, greater efficiencies in operations, and higher returns than either company could achieve standing alone.
However, the retailing experts and the market offered mixed reviews on the deal. Many questioned how combining two retailers that were struggling would produce an entity that would compete with the likes of Wal-Mart and Target. Both Kmart and Sears had impressive strengths and brands. Kmart was strong in home furnishings and apparel, including such lines as Thalia Sodi, Jacklyn Smith, Joe Boxer, Martha Stewart Everyday, Route 66, and Sesame Street. Sears was well known for its appliances and tools, lawn and garden products, and had such key brands as Kenmore, Craftsman, and DieHard. However, retailing experts noted that while operational synergies would certainly reduce costs, lack of a merchandise strategy that resonated with consumers would hinder the merged company from recapturing the power of either brand (Knowledge@Wharton 2005) .
Many observers speculated that Eddie Lampert may have plans to break apart the merged company and sell the assets. Land's End, the clothing label that Sears bought for $2 billion and that had turned out to be a disappointing acquisition, was the obvious choice. Others in the market had the opposite view and conjectured that Eddie Lampert was using the Sears Holding Company as a publicly traded vehicle to house a portfolio of private and public companies, much like Warren Buffet created Berkshire Hathaway to buy lower-valued companies and turn them around (Cramer 2005 Record the discharge of debt; eliminate the existing liabilities subject to compromise, record the payment of liabilities, and the issue of new debt. Cancel the old equity and establish the issue of new equity. Record the asset value adjustments so as to adjust the assets to the fair values as determined in the allocation of the reorganization value. Record the amount of goodwill, if any, for the reorganization value in excess of the value assigned to the specific assets. 
Basis of Presentation
The unaudited Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet distinguishes pre-petition liabilities subject to compromise from both those pre-petition liabilities that are not subject to compromise and from post-petition liabilities. Liabilities subject to compromise are reported at the amounts expected to be allowed, even if they may be settled for lesser amounts. In accordance with SOP 90-7, we adopted Fresh Start accounting as of the Confirmation Date. However, in light of the proximity of such date to our quarter end, for accounting purposes, the effects of Fresh Start accounting and the Plan of Reorganization, including the cancellation of the existing common stock and the issuance of the new common stock, have been reported ''as if'' they occurred on April 30, 2003.
Fresh-Start Accounting

Fresh-Start Adjustments
In accordance with Fresh Start accounting, all assets and liabilities are recorded at their respective fair market values. Such fair values represent our best estimates based on independent appraisals and valuations. To facilitate the calculation of the enterprise value of the Successor Company, we developed a set of financial projections. Based on these financial projections, the enterprise value was determined by the Company, with assistance of a financial advisor, using various valuation methods, including (i ) a comparison of the Company and its projected performance to the market values of comparable companies, (ii ) a review and analysis of several recent transactions of companies in similar industries to the Company, and (iii ) a calculation of the present value of the future cash flows under the projections. a To adjust assets and liabilities to fair market value (''FMV''), and reflect the write-off of Predecessor Company's equity and the application of negative goodwill to long-lived assets. b To record assumption or discharge of Liabilities subject to compromise and cash to be received from the Plan Investors. Table C1 ). Management of the Company, with the assistance of AlixPartners LLC, prepared the Analysis. The Analysis presents management's estimated net value of the Company's assets if the Debtors were to be liquidated under the provisions of Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the ''Code''), and the net proceeds of the liquidation were to be applied in strict priority to satisfy claims against the debtors.
The Analysis is limited to presenting information that was the representation of management and does not include an evaluation of the support for the underlying assumptions. The Analysis has not been examined or reviewed by independent accountants in accordance with standards promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The estimates and assumptions, although considered reasonable by management, are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies beyond the control of management. Accordingly, there can be no assurance that the results shown would be realized if the Company were liquidated and actual results in such case could vary materially from those presented.
For purposes of this Analysis, management assumes a liquidation would require three phases and would take place over 18 months. Phase I would comprise a three-month period during which inventories would be sold in a going-out-of-business sale (''GOB Sale'') conducted by a thirdparty. By the end of the GOB Sale substantially all store, distribution center, and field associates would be terminated. During Phase I, certain headquarters associates would be terminated including, for instance, staff of merchandising, merchandise finance, advertising, stores organization, loss prevention, maintenance, accounts payable, training, communications, and purchasing.
Phase II would comprise the next six-month period (and would actually have started during Phase I). During Phase II, the Company's real estate and most of the Company's non-real estate fixed assets would be marketed. In addition, headquarters operations would continue to wind down, and most remaining headquarters associates would be terminated. Certain headquarters personnel, such as staff in legal, finance and accounting, and information technology would be retained as necessary to support Phase III. Phase III would comprise a nine-month period after completion of the real estate marketing efforts during which any remaining litigation would be pursued, final tax returns filed, bankruptcy court reports and schedules filed, and remaining assets disposed.
While the Analysis assumes an 18-month liquidation time frame, final resolution of all preference actions is expected to extend 12 months beyond the 18-month liquidation time frame. All professional fees associated with resolution of such matters are contemplated in the estimated net recoveries from preferences actions.
Note 2 Accounts Receivable
Accounts receivable comprises a variety of accounts, the most sizeable being Pharmacy Receivables, Store Receivables, and Merchandise Allowance Receivables.
Pharmacy Receivables are receivables from third-party insurance companies in connection with the filling of prescriptions. All accounts aged past 60 days are fully reserved. Historical experience indicates that the Company's reserve policy has been sufficient in estimating losses incurred with this account.
Store Receivables are a combination of layaway receivables and credit extended at the store level by store management to customers. For purposes of the Analysis, the account is assumed to be primarily comprised of credit extended to customers and would be, in all likelihood, uncollectable.
Merchandise Allowance Receivables are allowances generated in connection with food products purchased through Fleming.
Other Receivables are comprised of a number of miscellaneous accounts such as rent due from subtenants and former subsidiaries, amounts due from landlords for repairs and maintenance, and amounts due from bad checks, etc. and have varying degrees of estimated collectability (see Table C2 ).
Note 3 Inventories
Merchandise inventories are assumed to be disposed of through a lawful ''going-out-ofbusiness sale'' commencing May 1, 2003, with no restrictions on the Company's ability to aggressively advertise the sale as a ''going-out-of-business sale'' (''GOB Sale''). The GOB Sale assumptions reflect the Company's experience in 2002 when it closed 283 stores over a ten-week time period and are adjusted where considered appropriate for the scale and timing of a mass liquidation, as well as for the projected composition of Company inventory at the commencement of a mass liquidation. The Low Recovery scenario assumes that the sale takes 13 weeks and reflects a lowered net recovery resulting from deeper discounts and increased direct expense. The High Recovery scenario assumes a ten-week sale period and is more reflective of the results achieved in the 2002 store closings. For purposes of the Analysis, GOB Sale Merchandise Inventory is the sum of perpetual inventories, imports paid not received, and merchandise letters of credit outstanding under the Company's projections as of April 30, 2003 (see Table C3 ).
Note 5 Net P&E-Owned and Leased
Net P&E includes owned land, buildings, furniture, fixtures, and equipment at the stores, distribution center, and corporate resource center, net of depreciation. Certain P&E is recorded as capitalized lease assets. Proceeds from the disposition of owned real estate and real estate leasehold interests were established using estimates provided by Rockwood Gemini Advisors.
Proceeds from the sale of furniture, fixtures, and equipment are estimated based on management's experience with store closings (see Table C4 ). a pro rata basis and serve to reduce the basis of our non-current assets. The remaining negative goodwill of $0.1 billion will be recorded in the income statement as an extraordinary gain.
Net Sales
Net 
Gross Margin
Gross margin as a percentage of net sales is projected to improve from 18.0 percent in 2002 to 21.5 percent in 2007. This improvement is driven by improved promotional productivity and favorable product mix. In addition, the Projections assume lower depreciation of buildings and leasehold improvements as a result of the write-down of assets for Fresh Start Accounting.
SG&A
Selling, general, and administrative expenses (''SG&A''), as a percentage of net sales, are projected to remain relatively flat at approximately 20 percent from 2002 to 2003 as lower depreciation expense generated by Fresh Start Accounting adjustments is mostly offset by the effects of store closings and the resulting lower sales base. Thereafter, SG&A is expected to improve to 17.9 percent of net sales by 2007. This improvement is primarily due to improved operating procedures and cost control initiatives at Kmart's headquarters.
Income Taxes
The Projections assume that Kmart will substantially offset its unused net loss carryforwards against the Company's cancellation of debt income at emergence. The effective tax rate going forward is estimated at 38.0 percent. Tax benefits will be fully reserved until utilization.
Capital Expenditures
The Projections assume that annual capital expenditures build from $350 million in 2003 to $600 million in 2007. The increase is primarily related to new store openings (a total of 70 through 2007) and updating the existing stores. 
CASE LEARNING OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE Overview
This is a comprehensive case that requires students to analyze Kmart Corporation's financial information, investigate the circumstances leading to its bankruptcy, and analyze accounting and valuation issues as it emerged from its Chapter 11 reorganization. The case has been prepared from publicly available information, including Kmart's 10-K and 10-Q filings, Joint Plan of Reorganization filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and news items in the business press. This case is targeted primarily at graduate-level courses in Financial Statement Analysis as well as Forecasting and Valuation.
Incremental Contribution of the Case
This teaching case provides several opportunities for the instructor to contribute to the students' learning experience in a typical financial statement analysis and/or forecasting and valuation courses. First, the case demonstrates the ability of a detailed financial ratio analysis (over time and compared to other firms) to predict bankruptcy. Second, the case introduces and demonstrates the implementation of Fresh Start Reporting for firms emerging from bankruptcy. Third, the case familiarizes the students with the institutional background of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and, in particular, the requirements for a liquidation analysis that demonstrates the value of the firm if it were to liquidate instead of reorganize. This is a fascinating part of the case because it illustrates possible methods to compute assets' liquidation values as well as a discussion of the effect of management incentives on the determination of these figures. Fourth, while there are many teaching cases whose objective is to derive equity values based on various valuation models, this case requires students to derive equity values based on the firm's own release of projected financial statements during bankruptcy, and discusses the potential for these forecasted statements and the resulting valuation to be biased. Finally, the case discusses the incentives of the various groups that are a part of a typical bankruptcy (e.g., management, creditors, and vulture investors) and demonstrates the effect of these incentives on the reported financial numbers (both on the projections provided during the bankruptcy and on the fresh start numbers). This provides students with a unique and clear-cut example of the use of reporting discretion in financial reporting.
There are a number of existing cases (primarily Harvard Business School cases) relating to bankruptcy and Chapter 11 reorganization. Some of these cases, such as Bankruptcy and Restructuring at Marvel Entertainment Group (Esty and Auerbach 2007) and Flagstar Companies Inc. (Gilson 2007 ) focus on the valuation of a company in a corporate restructuring. Other cases deal with the details of the restructuring process. For instance, Scott Paper Company (Gilson and Cott 1997) requires students to evaluate the optimal level of layoffs in a corporate downsizing program.
Two other cases deal with topics similar to the issues discussed in the Kmart case. In ''TWA: The Second Bankruptcy'' (Barth and Yildiz 2001) students are required to act as the holders of TWA's 8 percent secured notes and to analyze the information in the proxy statement in order to decide how to cast the vote on the firm's reorganization proposal. The second is ''Eddie Bauer'' (Healy et al. 2009 ), which is a comprehensive valuation case in a setting in which the firm is emerging from bankruptcy protection and later plans to go private. While both the TWA and the Eddie Bauer cases rely on details that are similar to those provided in the Kmart case, they primarily address valuation issues and do not focus on the same set of issues as the ones in the Kmart case (e.g., understanding the mechanics of the Fresh Start adjustments, the analysis of the financial performance of the firm prior to bankruptcy, and the assessment of the reasonableness of the
